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Development in technology is rapid, and same can be said particularly in the
telecommunication industry, which has experienced an explosive growth both
in the massive adoption rate of smart mobile devices and in the huge volume
of data traffic generated daily in the recent time. Mobile devices have become
extremely smart and used for purposes other than making calls and text messages,
making it become an integral part of everyday human life. But while we celebrate
this technological achievement, attacks on them have also increasingly become
alarming such that our sensitive data transported over the wireless network are
not only unsafe, but can easily be illegally requested for by an unauthorized device,
also participating invisibly in the network.
We briefly studied the security features available in different generations of mobile
communication technologies i.e 2G, 3G, and 4G, with the aim of understanding
how fake base station attacks practically occur, and to understand the effect of
exposing certain parameters such as IMEI/IMSI, LAC/CID to a third party,
usually an intruder.
This work focuses on proposing a detection methodology as a mitigating approach
to lessen fake base station attack in a cellular network. A fake base station is
an attacking equipment solely used to duplicate a legitimate base station. While
we acknowledge that the strategy of attack depends on the type of network, our
approach is based on finding dissimilarities in parameters such as the received
signal strengths, and existence of base stations participating in a network, from
two different database systems. With this set of information, it is possible to arrive
at a conclusion to state if a transmitting device is suspicious or legitimate. We
present our detecting and mitigating algorithm which is the objective of this work.
Keywords: Fake base station, Signal Strength, LAC/CID, IMEI/IMSI, Base
station (BS).
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview and Motivation
A large number of publications in recent times have increasingly sensitized us to the
dangers surrounding wireless communication channels and how data transported over
them have constantly been spied on [27] and used for some purposes unknown to the
rightful owners: A term referred to as unilateral surveillance [48]. As this form of
surveillance is rapidly becoming a norm and almost unstoppable [13], it has rendered
the constant effort and energy of security inclined organizations i.e. Information and
Infrastructure security companies and engineers, put into trying to curb them or
streamline into positive 1 use only almost unrecognizable and, or under-acknowledged.
In relation to the mobile telecommunication industry, network vulnerabilities
have always been a major concern for the mobile operators [50], but have also increas-
ingly become an important issue to the end users especially since the intervention
of those termed as “security whistle blowers” in attempts to create awareness on
privacy intrusion of data; a reference to the Snowden case [68]. This as a result,
has influenced two different levels of curiosity among the mobile technology users:
the majority that are concerned about the exposure of their sensitive data during
communication, and the others, attackers who are also concerned but also want to
gain access to unauthorized data for exploitation. However these two categories are
interpreted, both revolve around data, and while there are ongoing research work for
its protection, series of methods are also being devised [9] for its capture.
The use of fake base station is one of such. A fairly new and growing method
that is set up to monitor and gain access to network data traffic between two
end points, the user and the mobile operator. This specifically is what this work
centers around, to propose a methodology that can identify them when present in
a network. My proposition in terms of work done in this project is to mitigate
the effect of such entity. From a less technical perspective, communication can be
defined basically as an interaction between the Base Stations (henceforth, BS) and
the Mobile Stations (henceforth, MS). A Fake BS according to [57] is an equipment
located in restricted area to act as a real BS by broadcasting signals over air in
attempts to lure mobile devices around to connect to it. Since fake base stations are
dynamic in nature, meaning that their precise location in the network is difficult to
determine or track, it empowers them to outsmart target devices by obtaining all
possible IMSIs (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) within range, after forcing
a downgrade (illustrated in figure 1) on user equipment to a communication network
where weaker security mechanisms and encryption are used.
1for monitoring possible attacks or business growth predictions e.t.c
21.2 State of the art
Recent study has shown an increasing attack rate [11] against our mobile devices
and has triggered many security responses over the years. The 3GPP standard-
ization team 2 is one body that has constantly been involved in the creation of
standardization documents which help to adequately define needs, fixes, monitor
implementations and development, and the maintenance of these standards. Many
other security enthusiasts have also contributed tremendously but with more focus
on either stretching discussion on the existence of fake BS and how it works, or
through practical implementation of a similar form of attack simply to showcase
the weaknesses of the GSM security architecture, all of which serves as a good
foundation on which this work is built. This is evident in the summary of selected
list of publications (see chapter 3) chosen for review as we will later discuss.
Figure 1: Fake base station forcing a downgrade on mobile device: initial communi-
cation was via 3G but was tricked into communicating through 2G where it is easier
to penetrate.
1.3 Research methodology
Unlike most of the previous research works, the methodology embraced here is built
on the reasoning that it is only after the mobile operator is able to detect an attacker
(impersonating real base station) that a complete defense mechanism can be imple-
mented. What this translates into is that a potential fake base station should be
detectable by the operator, and then probably send an alert message to the user’s
mobile device, while an immediate counter response is instantaneously launched
2http://www.3gpp.org/
3together with the already available security protocols implemented to render such
attacks useless, known, and predictable in future occurrence.
To achieve this, some useful captured network parameters, that is constituted
by all participating devices, should be made available for an extensive study before
subjecting them to a comparative analysis to solidify the above approach. However,
different cases are considered in this work to ensure detailed coverage of relevant and
possible scenarios, all of which depend on how the attacking equipment is set up as
would later be discussed.
1.4 Thesis outline
• Chapter 2 centers on the security implementations and how protocols are
established between mobile device and the operator network during communi-
cation, in these selected mobile technologies. However, the omission of certain
technologies, especially before 2G is intentional, and this is because security
implementation in them is not accessible to the public, or there is no security
implementation at all except in their core networks.
• Chapter 3 summarizes selected work done till date relating to fake base station
and wireless security issues in general. The section begins by first establishing
distinctions between genuine and fake base stations, before delving into the
main discussion of what has been done.
• Chapter 4 introduces the practical measurement approach we gave this work
which is carried out in an attempt to be able to detect abnormalities through
comparison of two data set; one achieved from our measurement, and the other
from operator. The chapter ends with a summary of our observations from the
gathered data analysis and manual inspection.
• Chapter 5 presents the main work of this project, which is the detection and
mitigation of false base station as the title reads. A detailed discussion on
the cases considered, possible scenarios, short comings and assumptions made
leading to the proposed methodology are presented in this chapter.
It is however good to note ahead that some words are used synonymously in this
work, such as; false BTS, fake BTS, rogue BTS, to mean same. This should not
be mis-interpreted or cause confusion to mean something different, other than an
attacking device.
42 Security Evolution in Mobile Communication Tech-
nologies
Wireless communication is defined as the transfer of information from one location
to another regardless of the distance between, without the use of cables3 [28]. Un-
like in wired communication where data transportation relies on cables, making it
less difficult to trace attacks done through wiretapping since this requires physical
intervention. In wireless communication the story is different, and this is because
the transmission medium for data is air, through radio frequency propagation. This
means that an attacker does not need to be physically involved with or be around
its target before carrying out for instance a passive probing [42] attack on the radio
path, or perform some other form of attacks as described in [40].
The cellular network implementation did not start with the 2G technology [26, 66],
it only started gaining popularity as the technology became cheaper and accessible
to users [45] by bringing features that aid communication. Although other pecu-
liar reasons such as unavailability of a unified standardization body and proper
documentation, specifically in 1G, can be attributed to some of its undermined
nature such as: poor sound quality, frequent ongoing call drop, and issues with
security [46]. Before 2G, existing telephony technologies4 offered almost entirely
voice communication services [39] but with some limitations as already mentioned.
Those limitations got more attention and were improved in subsequent technologies,
starting with the 2G [29], where the switch from analog to digital system became a
reality. With digital communication [64], more advanced techniques became available
such as source coding which helps to efficiently use the scarce radio spectrum [18],
while interference and fading can also be reduced by using error correction coding
techniques [16], eventually translating into low power transmission.
Figure 2 shows the success of 2G and subsequent releases5 as it became widely
adopted and still in use. Some of the many reasons attributed to this success come
with the improvement in sound quality where talking became clearer, provision of
better data service (comparison to 1G), and most importantly the introduction
of standardization bodies to govern its development [45]. But even with all these,
protection over the communication path between mobile devices and their serving
network was still an issue. According to [46], lack of cryptographic protection in 2G
systems exposed the vulnerability of sensitive control data i.e. the key used for radio
interface ciphering becomes vulnerable when subjected to brute force attacks6. In
other words, while 2G overcame certain limitations of the previous technologies, its
radio link connection to an external device in the mobile equipment module, and
3Twisted-pair, co-axial, fibre-optics [67]
41G
52.5G, 2.75G.
6systematically checking all possible keys or passwords until the correct one is found [37].
5a few other factors7 needed to be improved. This motivated the move for better
security and mobility implementation in the next generation.
Figure 2: 2G’s success and adoption over the years (From [63]): figure illustrates
both its rise before the introduction of newer technologies and decline from year 2013.
According to [6], the third generation of mobile networks is designed to fix in-
herited weaknesses from earlier technologies and to offer stronger security features
over the entire network. It is the standard that revolutionized the mobile industry,
enabling network operators to offer subscribers better and newer services. These
services [35] include the long planned smooth mobility, multimedia services [19],
possibility to access e-mail, perform online bank transactions, and unlimited network
connection on mobile devices irrespective of the device mode8 or location. However,
with this new set of features, daily network traffic management became the new
problem, while attacks on 3G networks decreases because of the strong 2-way authen-
tication security protocol (see section 2.2 for details) implemented to establish trust
between serving network and mobile device [28, 46]. The success of this technology
as shown in figure 3 is measured by its increasing global adoption rate over the years.
The latest of these standards of mobile communication technologies is the 4G.
Its objective [21, 36] is to meet the exhaustive bandwidth usage that is rapidly
increasing due to the enormous use of smart mobile devices, generating massive
traffic as devices have become smarter and highly feature equipped. Logically, this
implies that 4G inherited all the security properties implemented in earlier mobile
7active attack on the network, secrecy [46] in some part of the network architecture
8active or idle mode
6technologies9, mostly 3G, and even got improved10 as a way of complementing initial
set objectives [20].
Figure 3: 3G network global acceptance over the years (From [61]): a rise in 3G
devices and connections measured in billions, causes decline in 2G while 4G slowly
rise.
Figure 4: 2G Network Architecture.
2.1 2G Authentication and Encryption
Like every other wireless technologies, 2G (popularly referred to as GSM) suffers
the risks of being susceptible to attackers either: during transmission session done
93.5G, 3.75G.
10Long Term Evolution
7through the radio link between mobile devices and serving network, or in idle state [43].
While 2G is rapidly becoming less significant in the current mobile technological
trend [12], it is still the most suitable network to launch fake base station attacks
since it possess weak and hackable [47] security architecture. An overview of the GSM
system architecture is given in figure 4 to show how components are inter-connected.
However, the two major security features [4, 62] introduced to mitigate risks in
2G are:
1. User authentication
2. Encryption of user traffic.
The system depicted in figure 4 comprises many network elements but is technically
separated into three functional units [32]: the Mobile Station, the Base Station
Subsystem, and the GSM Core Network.
• Mobile Station (MS):
This unit represents a collection of various equipments 11 used by the subscriber
for communication purposes through the network. One very important but
small-sized physical component present in the mobile station is the SIM card:
Subscriber Identity Module. It holds vital information 12 about the user, and
also participates in the user authentication process by providing some useful
parameters (see section 2.1.1) as we shall see in the discussion relating to
confidentiality [45] in the next subsection.
• Base Station Subsystem:
Mobile Station is not designed to talk directly with the core network, for this
reason it needs an intermediary which is the BSS. BSS consists of group of
infrastructure machines 13 that are responsible for the cellular aspect of GSM.
One of its functionality includes transmission and reception on the radio path
and its management after.
A reference to figure 4 indicates that this module contains two main elements
and they are;
– BTS (Base Transceiver Station): This is the element in the BSS module
that interacts directly with the mobile devices through the available
radio interface, and its primary functionality revolves around transmission
between mobile device and the network [45].
– BSC (Base Station Controller) is responsible for handling the traffic and
signaling between mobile station and network switching subsystem. In
functionality terms, this is the managing equipment which work includes:
11vehicle-mounted, portable devices and hand held mobile devices [45]
12such as: IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity), subscriber’s telephone directory,
encryption codes [3]
13Base transceiver station, base station controller
8allocation of radio channels, measurements received from mobile devices,
and handover control between BTSs [45].
• GSM Core Network:
This is the backbone of the whole network where functionalities such as mobility
management, switching of roaming calls, and the data hub of the network is
situated. Its main role is to manage communication between users in its own
network and other networks. It comprises of network elements such as;
– MSC (Mobile services Switching Centers): This controls several BSCs
connected to it, and performs the switching of calls between the mobile
and other mobile network users, as well as the management of mobile
services14. MSC also performs functions such as network interfacing, toll
ticketing, and common channel signaling.
– VLR (Visitors Location Register): This is a temporary database that
holds roaming user information that MSC uses to service them.
– HLR (Home Location Register): This is the container for the permanent
storage of subscriber specific parameters, location area code, and many
more.
– AuC (Authentication Center): This is also a form of database which
contains a copy of secret keys used for user authentication to the network.
Breaking the network into three distinct units gives the opportunity to clearly identify
each segment of the network during the authentication process analysis, and also note
their contributions. This way, the authentication procedure explanation between the
mobile device and the network as described in the following algorithm can be better
understood using this sequence diagram of figure 5.
2.1.1 User Authentication in 2G
Authentication in GSM systems is one-way [59], and it is performed by the serving
network to strengthen the network security both by identifying the device trying
to connect to it and generating an encryption key [62] that is used to protect user
data during transfer. However, pre-authentication condition [34, 44] necessitate that
both the mobile device and the authentication center must already have a secret
permanent key, denoted as Ki, created and stored in them (refer to fgure 4 to see
where these two are located). This key is stored in the SIM card (see section 2.1)
and must be kept safe and secret to just the device.
User authentication algorithm:
1. User starts by sending its unique identity, IMSI15, to VLR.
14registration, authentication, location updating, handovers, and call routing to a roaming
subscriber.
15Every mobile device in a network has this
9Figure 5: GSM Authentication sequence diagram showing how the process unfolds
between these entities.
2. Since VLR can not decide to authenticate user on its own, it passes this
information to the HLR to notify the network of user’s intention to connect to
it.
3. In response, HLR generates a random number known as RAND, and a cipher
key, KC, for subsequent connection attempt. It also generates the security
result, SRES. All these three parameters, refered to as the authentication
vectors or GSM triplets, are sent back to the VLR.
4. VLR only transferred RAND to the user but keeps both the cipher key, KC,
and the SRES for authentication purposes.
5. User’s mobile device, transfers this to its SIM card to resolve. In SIM is a
one-way function, A3, that takes its input:Ki and RAND to calculate RES and
sends back to VLR.
6. VLR checks the received RES from mobile user and compares it with the SRES
received from the HLR. If both matches, VLR sends to user’s device, Kt and a
TMSI for connection. Meaning that user does not need to contact the HLR in
subsequent authentication attempts.
2.1.2 2G data traffic encryption
In figure 4, we observe the need to secure the radio path between the base station and
the mobile station. It is not just enough to be able to identify the connecting device,
but also to secure the transmission path so that the data in transit is protected from
a malicious attacker. As we shall present and discuss in chapter 4, some attacks pass
through the weak authentication [15] challenge-response protocol in GSM or act as a
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form of man in the middle attack thereby intercepting communication in order to
gain access to unauthorized data.
According to [62], and figure 7, every SIM card has a secret key Ki, when used
with the A8 algorithm [34] generates a cipher key, Kc. The combination of both A5
algorithm and Kc as depicted in figure 6, becomes the tool to encrypt and decrypt
data over the radio path between mobile device and base station. Generally, A5
is the known algorithm used in 2G to protect the radio path and it comes in two
variants: A5/1 and A5/2. The first variant of the A5 algorithm is the european
version which is known to be stronger than the second [34].
Figure 6: Encrypting data using a ciphering key.
Figure 7: GSM Security Architecture (From [34]): colour indicates different sec-
tions of the GSM network element division and algorithms each implement during
authentication and encryption processes.
2.2 3G Authentication and Encryption
While 2G already offered voice communication and some messaging features16, 3G
technology which is popularly known as UMTS, focused on provision of stronger
16SMS, GPRS, WAP [53]
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security implementation than in earlier technologies while also offering both mobility
in the true sense and better multimedia services [35, 46].
UMTS architecture, as depicted in figure 8, is similar to the GSM but with several
modifications. The access network is referred to as Universal Terrestrial Radio Access
Network (UTRAN) and comprises of two entities; several base stations known as
NodeBs and Radio Network Controller (RNC). The Core Network however supports
both packet and circuit switched connections, which are used for carrying other
data 17 and voice services respectively [51].
Figure 8: UMTS network architecture.
Since 3G is the modified version of previous technology, its security architecture
retained the structure of 2G but with additional new set of cryptographic functions 18
to address inherited problems such as;
• unsecured radio path between mobile device and network
• unsecured sensitive data
• one sided network authentication
which means that the network security architecture, shown in figure 10 became more
complex than in the previous technology. Similar to 2G, the whole system is divided
into three units comprising the User equipment, serving network, and the home
network.
17web browsing through HTTP, and file download / upload through FTP.
18cryptographic functions: f0, f1, f2, f3, f4, f5, f8, f9 [5]
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2.2.1 User Authentication in 3G
Unlike in 2G where only the network gets permission to ask for authentication, mobile
devices are also empowered to challenge the network to authenticate itself. Meaning
that the inherited one-way authentication method is dropped, and a new two-way
authentication method is implemented in 3G as the following algorithm describes.
However, initial condition is that USIM19 must contain a secret key, Ki [34]. Refer
to figure 9 to view user authentication sequence diagram.
Figure 9: UMTS authentication sequence diagram indicating how the process is
established and the interactions between network entities.
The following describes user authentication procedure as it is done in 3G:
1. Firstly, an RRC connection (Radio resource Control) [52] is established between
the Mobile device and network. This signals the beginning of a session, while
MS uses it as an opportunity to send its security capabilities to the base station.
2. User’s device send its TMSI20 through the base station to the network.
3. Serving network then sends a request for authentication data from the home
network.
4. Mobile’s home network as a response generates a set of authentication vectors
which includes random challenge: denoted as RAND, expected response: de-
noted as XRES, an authentication token: denoted as AUTN, encryption and
integrity keys: CK and IK respectively.
19A smart card inserted into the mobile device
20will be requested to send its IMSI only if the network is unable to resolve its TMSI
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5. Serving network keeps both generated keys and expected response from the
network, sending only RAND and AUTN to the mobile device.
6. Mobile device’s USIM verifies the received AUTN to check its genuity21.
7. If valid, mobile device sends back its authentication response, denoted as RES,
to the serving network.
8. As a security measure, serving base station also compares received response,
RES, with XRES to check the correctness. If there is a match, then the
authentication phase is successful.
An important step to note in the above process is the part where mobile device
also verifies the AUTN in order to confirm its genuity. If for instance after verification
the token was confirmed faulty, mobile device will discard the message giving it the
power to also verify if the serving network is genuine or not from the home network.
2.2.2 Encryption of user traffic in 3G
Mutual authentication is a fraction of the needed security measure for protecting the
whole mobile communication networks. While this mechanism is successful at verify-
ing authentication conformity of participating network elements, it is not designed to
cover the radio path security, which is a very crucial aspect of any wireless communi-
cation network. The encryption mechanism implementation in 3G serves this purpose.
Traffic encryption revolves around CK and IK [46]. In reality, radio link itself
can not be fully protected from external attacks, meaning that attackers can tamper
with the path but transferred data can be protected from getting hijacked by an
eavesdropper. According to [55], the cryptographic function responsible for user data
confidentiality is f8, while f9 is responsible for the protection of user data integrity
in UMTS, both based on the KASUMI [38] algorithm. With the aid of figure 10,
UMTS confidentiality encryption algorithm is described as follows:
1. f8 algorithm in the user’s device computes an output bit stream using CK
transferred to it by USIM.
2. This output bit stream is XORed22 bit by bit with the data stream, also known
as plaintext to obtain ciphertext.
3. Ciphertext is sent to the network through radio link.
4. The f8 algorithm in RNC 23 uses the same inputs as the user equipment,
including the shared cipher key CK, to generate the same output bit stream
that was computed in the user equipment.
21MAC must be equal to XMAC otherwise, it is not accepted
22mathematical approach
23Radio Network Controller [41]
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5. The output bit stream is XORed with the ciphertext received to recover the
initial information.
Figure 10: UMTS Security Architecture (From [34]): different colours to indicate
different sections of the UMTS network element and algorithm implementation during
authentication and encryption processes.
2.3 4G Authentication and Encryption
4G is the current state of mobile communication technology with two standards:
WIMAX and the more popular LTE, developed to meet defined requirements for the
present and future needs of mobile communication. Although the earlier discussed
generations i.e. 2G and 3G are still the global dominating technologies in use, LTE
was developed by 3GPP with strong consideration for security to mitigate observed
limitations in earlier generations [8].
LTE major difference from others lie in the way its cryptographic protection is
provided on many different layers and as such deviates from applying the usual fixed
set of standardized module, as used in 2G and 3G, to having quite a number of
choices of security functionalities to decide from [34]. Figure 11 and 12 below gives a
glimpse of the LTE network and security architecture respectively.
2.3.1 Authentication procedure in 4G
Authentication is done between user equipment and the network using a procedure
known as EPS-AKA. This procedure is built on the concept of mutual authentication,
otherwise referred to as two-way authentication (see section 2.2.1) but with a slight
difference in method. Aside the difference in cryptographic procedure and key
hierarchy used, network is more involved [7] in handling the authentication procedure,
15
Figure 11: LTE network architecture.
Figure 12: 4G Security Architecture (From [34]): colour code indicates different
entities and the security functions they possess.
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and 4G mobile station module uses USIM with more complexity than its predecessor.
This is evident in the sequence diagram depicted in figure 13 and a narrative algorithm
that follows:
Figure 13: 4G Authenticaton sequence diagram showing entities interaction with
one another and the order.
1. User device triggers connection request sending its TMSI and security capabili-
ties to the serving network.
2. This attempt triggers the EPS-AKA authentication procedure. Serving net-
work, starting with eNode forwards received parameters, i.e. IMSI, security
capabilities, to MME.
3. MME attaches it own identity, SNid, and forwards both the user’s device
identifier, IMSI, and its own identity, SNid, to the home network.
4. Home network generates RAND, AUTN, XRES, and Kasme (access security
management entity key) using EPS-AKA algorithm which it then sends back
to MME.
5. MME stores received parameters from home network before selecting one of
them for mutual authentication purpose and sends both RAND and AUTN to
user’s mobile.
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6. Mobile device’s USIM verifies the received AUTN to check its genuity. If this
is genuine, then mobile device authenticates network and generates response
which is sent to the MME through eNode.
7. MME compares to verify the correctness of received RES response from mobile
with its own XRES i.e. XRES=RES. If it matches, it sends to the device
KEYS which are used to protect NAS 24, while base station also derives and
send key to protect AS as well as user data.
Through this procedure, both user device and network are authenticated. For
clarity, MME is verified, or authenticated, by the home network when its SNid 25 was
sent along with the user IMSI in the third step of the EPS-AKA procedure above.
2.3.2 Encryption of user data in 4G
Since mutual authentication is already established between device and network, it
means that they both share same Kasme as an authentication key which is useful to
encrypt user data during communication [24]. LTE uses two approaches to set up
maximum data protection, and these are;
• NAS Security:
This security deals with making sure that the signaling messages between user
equipment and the MME over radio path is secured. It is mandatory in this
procedure that the integrity check is performed, while ciphering is not [25].
The procedure is as follows:
1. MME selects ciphering and integrity algorithm to be used based on user
device’s security capabilities earlier sent during authentication. Also
generates NAS-MAC (Message Access Code) for integrity. It sends this
to user’s device using Security Mode Command.
2. User’s device verifies parameters received through Security Mode Com-
mand for genuity. Meaning that it generates XNAS-MAC and compares
it with NAS-MAC. User’s equipment then encrypts response message:
Security Mode Complete, using agreed encryption algorithm and then
send to MME.
3. MME decrypts and verifies the integrity of the Security Mode Complete
message received from user. Once that is confirmed to be genuine, then
the NAS set up is complete, meaning that messages sent after this can be
encrypted and integrity protected.
• AS Security:
Unlike in NAS, both integrity and cipher checks of RRC signaling messages
24Non-Access Stratum [33]
25Serving Network identity
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and ciphering of IP packets are mandatory here. AS security ensures the secure
delivery of data between user’s device and MME [25].
The procedure is as follows:
1. eNodeB selects security algorithm i.e. ciphering and integrity algorithms,
to use. It generates MAC-I and attaches this to Security Mode Command
message which is forwards to user’s device.
2. User’s device verifies that the received MAC-I matches its own XMAC-I.
If this matches, it then sends Security Mode Complete message to eNodeB.
3. eNodeB verifies the integrity of this message, and if it matches, all the
RRC messages between user’s device and eNodeB are integrity protected
and encrypted, and all the IP packets are also encrypted before being
sent.
While we already have established an understanding of the authentication and
encryption methods used in 2G, 3G, and 4G respectively, the next chapter discusses
limitations still present in these mobile networks and what has been proposed by
researchers to mitigate against a specific type of attack, fake base station.
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3 Fake Base Station: Summary till date
3.1 Describing Fake Base Station
To define what a fake base station is, one would also need to raise discussion on the
non-fake, a legitimate base station, and the services it renders. This way, distinction
between these two can therefore be identified as a way of establishing fake base station
abnormalities which serves as the foundation for further work. According to [1],
a base station is a network entity 26 responsible for serving one cell and ensuring
connectivity between the subscribers in that cell and the core network. This means
that a mobile device wishing to use the resources provided by a serving network must
do so through a serving base station for that cell, and therefore exposes its sensitive
data to the environment.
On the other hand, a fake base station [23] is a malicious station that acts as a
legitimate one. For several reasons (see section 3.1.1), network subscribers are tricked
into thinking the established connection and interaction is with a legitimate base
station while unknowingly being exploited. Unlike a legitimate base station that has
a fixed tower structure for broadcast [22], fake base stations are usually smaller and
mobile [49] thereby making it possible to constantly change location in order to get
closer to targets. This mobility characteristics makes it difficult to detect a fake base
station when present in the network. Figure 14 shows three equipment 27 interacting
while the fake base station transmits close to the mobile station.
Figure 14: Fake base station transmitting to a mobile station at a close range.
26All the equipment that makes up a wireless/cellular network
27mobile device, legitimate base station, and fake base station
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3.1.1 Possible attack scenarios
There are several types of attacks [2] a base station can possibly launch. While
majority of these attacks are directed toward the mobile devices, some few are also
launched at the core networks. Security implementations in the core network of
standards like UMTS and LTE, i.e. 3G and 4G respectively (refer to section 2), are
strongly designed to withstand the maneuvering tactics of a fake base station. But
in 2G, the security design is weak against such attack making it the most ”friendly”
network environment for fake base stations to operate. The type of attacks are
classified as shown in figure 15 below followed by the description of each of these.
Figure 15: Classification of fake base station attack types.
• Impersonation:
An intruder poses to be some other. It is the case of identity theft, and can be
done in two ways. One is to hijack the mobile user’s identity through the use
of complex attack phones and then starts communicating with the network,
presenting itself like the rightful user [2]. This is called: Impersonation of
user.
The second technique deals with the intruder presenting itself as a legitimate
network equipment authorized to communicate with the mobile users [2]. This
is refered to as: Impersonation of the Network.
• Intercept:
Interception is a form of a man in the middle attack where the attacker blocks
the communication from the mobile device to the legitimate base station.
• Eavesdropping:
This occurs when an intruder secretly listens to the conversation of others
without having the right to do so. Although there are two types of eavesdropping:
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Active and Passive, but when discussing fake base station attacks, attention
is then more on the active. Reason being that a passive eavesdropper is not
necessarily affecting the communication between sender and receiver [17], it
monitors and listens, although could also be useful in carrying out attack [40].
The attacker in active may partially or fully know the texts being transported,
however, it actively injects own message to translate the texts in session if
partially unknown, or create decryption on the packages if text is known.
3.2 Proposed solutions and methodologies
Many research papers treating the fake base stations as a topic have been published
over the years. Some of these publications not only identified the risks on mobile
network securities, but also proposed some rectifications or solutions that deem
fit to curb this growing fake base station attacks. We have chosen a few of these
publications for summary as this would help identify the next direction and what
could be done as a contribution to the fight against wireless network attacks.
3.2.1 Work on risks and detection of Fake base station
Mazroa and Arozullah [10] proposed a rogue base station identification protocol
to protect the privacy of user equipment in the network. Their work is based on
utilizing mobile properties captured during measurement in different locations, to
estimate location and power of the base stations. The proposed protocol acts as
a verifier that distinguishes genuine base station from fake. If the base station is
confirmed or verified to be genuine, then user’s equipment is allowed to connect to it.
Figure 16: Proposed protocol for detecting false base station in [10].
Their solution relies on the decision of a cloud server which contains the list of
real base stations for comparison purpose. So after the mobile station has measured
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surrounding base stations received signals, it sends these parameters to the cloud
server for verification and waits for response. The logic behind these is the fact that
a real base station transmission coverage area should be large while a fake one only
covers small area [10]. Based on this, a fake base station can be identified. Figure 16
captures the verification procedure summarized above.
Figure 17: Flowchart for rogue base station detection from [22].
Deepti and Khokhar [22] also worked on resolving the fake base station attack
issues proposing a method built on the concept of dynamic threshold for calculating
the sensitivity of base station and specific values to derive some attributes which
aids in the decision making for detecting fake base stations. These attributes include;
height, angle, and acceptable distance. Their proposed solution is a scanning algo-
rithm which by the use of sensors check through the spectrum completely at every
2ms (time) for the sensitivity of base station. In order word, there must already be a
defined threshold, calculated as the mean of collected sensitivity values in the last
twenty-four hours, to represent the standard value by which newly measured values
are compared. The sensors reading these values were given allowable error threshold
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of 0.1% to make decision accuracy flexible afterwards so that legitimate base stations
are not mistakenly classified as fake. A work flow-chart, in figure 17, describes how
the protocol procedure is performed.
In the work of Song Y et al [57], a software radio platform was developed and
made to run a Base Transceiver Station protocol stack. This way it was possible
to launch two types of attack: first one is an IMSI/IMEI catcher, while the second
is a selective jamming attack. Main idea is that the developed system was able to
transmit alongside other base stations, and user was able to connect to this fake
base station under the condition that it appears to be in the BCCH allocation
list of the AM3517 experiment kit 28 used for its design. Meaning that without
the use of a jamming device, it is possible to trick mobile devices to connect to
this fake Base station and then provide parameters such as IMSI/IMEI to the attacker.
The second proposed attack, a selective jamming protocol, implements a two
way 29 decision approach to either block targeted mobile device or not. The first
approach deals with manipulation of signal transmission power, making fake base
station power higher than the legitimate therefore luring the mobile device, while
second approach is a display of power on connected mobile devices. Their work
basically is to expose the vulnerability of network technologies, particularly in 2G.
Figure 18: The scanning-interval algorithm procedure from [14].
28A high-performance electronic board device that can be configured to create software radio.
29Cell selection and re-selection, and blocking method
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Barbeau and Robert [14] published a scanning interval algorithm to detect
rogue base. This technique is based on the received signal strength (henceforth, RSS).
When the RSS of the serving base station falls below a defined threshold, mobile
device can initiate handover in search for better service from neighboring cells in
order to maintain quality of service. To do this, MS demands from current serving
network the permission to scan and assess surrounding base stations. Figure 18
depict procedure flow.
The procedure begins with mobile device sending to its serving network a scan-
ning interval allocation request (MOB-SCN-REQ) message. Serving base station
sends a scanning interval allocation response (MOB-SCN-RES) message back to the
mobile device. This response contains MAC addresses of recommended base stations.
The mobile device can decide to perform association tests with these recommended
base stations during the allocated scanning interval. However, mobile device sends
a scanning result report (MOB-SCN-REPORT) message back to the serving BS.
Algorithm is then run on received report, known to consist of a list of pairs of
recommended base stations parameters i.e. a base station ID and corresponding RSS
value. The RSS parameter is what the algorithm mainly uses to detect malicious
stations. Two limitations observed in this algorithm are: it only works when mobile
device is performing the scanning interval routine, and has a level of uncertainty in
accuracy.
Ramanpreet and Sukhwinder [56] proposed a rogue base station detection
protocol that centers on Wimax/802.16 network, based on observed inconsistencies
both in sensitivity and received signal strength measurement reported by mobile
station. Their work rely basically on the use of parameters such as; signal-to-noise
ratio, path loss, and receiver sensitivity, to detect fake base stations.
Proposed method works as a sensitivity algorithm applying the fundamental
understanding that a Wimax device can measure the variations in the received signal
strength coming from a transmitting base station. And in a similar approach as those
presented in the work of Barbeau et al (already described above), algorithm scans, for
all frequencies at every interval of 2msc in order to detect a rogue base station. Since
received signal strength is the base for this algorithm, their work also considered
factors such as unusual or abnormal noise, and interference, as those can affect the
received value. In a summary, their proposed algorithm calculates the received signal
power as well as path loss based on optimal sampling frequencies, before comparing
them with the threshold. Depending on the outcome of this comparison, for instance
if checksum error is too great, then an alarm signal beeps on the mobile.
These few selected publications is a way of demonstrating that research work in
the security field, particularly communication sector, is non-stop. Either by showing
that fake BTS exists, or by proposing a detection methodology, all work still points
in one direction. The next chapter presents our data collection procedure, useful for
practical analysis to detect one, in later work.
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4 Practical network activity measurement
In this section, we describe in detail the procedures and factors taken into considera-
tion for data collection with the objective of seeing several types of on going events,
and to possibly identify abnormalities such as:
• Unusual long cuts in the network, both in 2G and 3G, while still connected to
BTS
• Base stations with unusual power
• Base stations with unusual LAC/CID/MNC
• Deactivation of encryption
• Sudden downgrades from 3G to 2G
• Inavailability of encryption, especially status changes (A5/3 to A5/1/0).
on three mobile networks in Finland. However, full details about the hardware,
software, and protocol used can be found in the next section. Section ends with the
presentation of covered areas and observations in them.
4.1 Experimental protocol
4.1.1 Protocol
To conduct this study, we selected three busy areas in the Helsinki neighborhood
namely: Eira, Kulosaari, and Kuusisaari. This areas are of particular interest be-
cause of the concentration of Embassies (see 6) situated in those locations making
it attractive enough to motivate attackers and spies. The measurements are based
on the use of both software applications and physical equipment to capture possible
network activities happening around target locations, while the interest for doing
this is to be able to extract useful parameters such as: LAC/CID 30 changes, the
network type i.e. 2G or 3G, and power received from the BTS, all to aid analysis.
Three mobile phones (see section 4.1.3 for specification) were used as the physi-
cal equipment for capturing, with each having one of the three networks (refer to
section 4.1.5) SIM cards inserted. The same experiments (see protocol below), are
run on all three phones (and therefore, networks) at the same time. For the second
measurement, we manually downgraded from 3G to 2G on all these phones within a
few seconds and at the same time, then run same protocol again as given below.
The overall protocol is:
1. Reach one of the selected areas.
30Location Area Code / Cell IDentity
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2. Set phone networks to WCDMA / UMTS mode only (3G).
3. Start data recording on both. Snoopsnitch and AIMSI catcher
4. Run 5x4 tests in Snoopsnitch, several times.
5. Walk around the area while running active tests.
6. After one “tour” is done, switch all phone networks to 2G mode only.
7. Restart the same experiments on 2G, with similar “tour”.
4.1.2 Software used
• Snoopsnitch According to the website31 description: “SnoopSnitch is an An-
droid app that collects and analyzes mobile radio data to make you aware of
your mobile network security and to warn you about threats like fake base
stations (IMSI catchers), user tracking and over the-air updates. With Snoop-
Snitch you can use the data collected in the GSM Security Map at gsmmap.org
and contribute your own data to GSM Map.” The application logs all activity
in a SQLite database on the phone memory, including GPS position, recorded
cell data, and results of the active tests it performs.
In order to run this application to capture mobile network and access data
thereafter, root privileges are required [60]. Several versions have been released
but the latest version is 0.9.7 (as at 4th of May, 2015).
• Android IMSI Catcher From the website32 description: “Android-based
project to detect and avoid fake base stations (IMSI-Catchers) in GSM/UMTS
Networks. The application logs similar data as the Snoopsnitch one, also in a
SQLite database but there is no active testing for this one. So regardless of
whoever 33 is attempting to sniff or catch our data, this application is aimed
at detecting them and giving users safer experience through an alert on their
devices on possible tracking or interception [54].
There has been several versions of the application released till date, and the
latest version is Version 0.1.28-alpha-b00 (as at 4th of May, 2015)
4.1.3 Hardware used
• Sony Xperia Z2
1. Model Number: D6503
2. Processor: Qualcomm MSM8974PRO-AB
31https://opensource.srlabs.de/projects/snoopsnitch
32https://secupwn.github.io/Android-IMSI-Catcher-Detector/
33The authorities or hackers
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3. Android: 4.4.2
4. Baseband: 8974-AAAAANPZQ-00015-10
5. Build Number: 17.1.2.A.0.314
6. IMEI: 355609063515414
7. Serial: BH916MF116
8. Network: DNA
• Sony Xperia Z2
1. Model Number: D6503
2. Processor: Qualcomm MSM8974PRO-AB
3. Android: 4.4.2
4. Baseband: 8974-AAAAANPZQ-00015-10
5. Build Number: 17.1.2.A.0.314
6. IMEI: 355609064637514
7. Serial: BH91A4YA16
8. Network: Sonera
• Galaxy Note 2
1. Model Number: GT-N7105
2. Processor: Qualcomm MSM8974PRO-AB
3. Android: 4.4.2
4. Baseband: N7105XXUFND3
5. Build Number: KOT49H.N7105XXUFNE3
6. IMEI:
7. Serial: Exynos 4 Quad4412
8. Network: Elisa
4.1.4 Software installed
• Snoopsnitch, version 0.9.3
• AIMSI Catcher, version 0.1.25-alpha-b6
• Xposed Framework, version 2.6.1
• Xprivacy module, version 3.6
• Root, SuperSU, version 2.01
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4.1.5 SIM Cards used
• 2.5.1 Saunalahti Prepaid
1. Number: 0456 xxx xxx
• 2.5.2 Sonera Prepaid
1. Number: 0402 xxx xxx
• 2.5.3 DNA Prepaid
1. Number: 0449 xxx xxx
4.2 Data extraction and observation
Measured data from experiments are stored in the core 34 of the mobile phones, not
on the detachable SD-Card or temporary storage unit on the phone, and therefore
requires root access to get these files. In this case, data folder path to each of the three
phones are similar and given below for both Snoopsnitch and AIMSICD application:
• Snoopsnitch: /data/data/Android/de.srlabs.snoopsnitch/
• AIMSICD: /data/data/Android/COM.SecUpwN.AIMSICD/
The main file that holds data is saved as a .db extension in SQLite format, this
suggest the use of a database editor to read file. In this case, preferred option to use
is the SQLiteBrowser with which the file was opened and studied.
4.2.1 Observation on Eira
Data was captured in Eira on two different days, 2015-02-05 and 2015-03-03, as both
Figure 19 and Figure 20 depicts, following different routes as a way of spreading
search coverage area. The duration to complete the first Measurement took almost
three hours: starting from 11:31:57 till 14:14:27, while the second took 1:20:26 to
complete.
4.2.1.1 Elisa
• Cuts for 2-5 seconds over UMTS (no network)
• One long cut of 27 over UMTS (no network)
• Almost 2 minutes lost network while switching from 3G to 2G, connected to
one BTS, but no network
4.2.1.2 Sonera
• Nothing to remark
34in-built memory
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Figure 19: Itinerary in Eira on 2015-02-05. Red dots indicate approximate location
of major events.
Figure 20: Itinerary in Eira on 2015-03-03. Red dots indicate approximate location
of major events .
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4.2.1.3 DNA
• Downgrade to 2G for 2 minutes 49 seconds
• Lost network for 8 minutes 51 seconds while switching 3G to 2G (connected to
2 BTS with varying power)
4.2.2 Observation on Kulosaari
Similarly, data capturing was done on two different days, 2015-02-13 and 2015-03-03,
and in two different routes as depicted in Figure 21 and Figure 22 respectively.
4.2.2.1 Elisa
• Multiple cuts from 3G network over UMTS, no CID or 29006/422217
• Up to 3 minutes cuts, sometimes connected to 29006/422217
• Lost network while switching from 3G to 2G, for 1 minute
4.2.2.2 Sonera
• Lost network for 1 minute 13 seconds while switching from 2G to 3G (connected
to one BTS, varying power)
• Connected to unknown BTS (LAC/CID reported 2147483647, which means
unknown for Android) for 20 seconds, varying power. This could be normal
4.2.2.3 DNA
• Downgrade to 2G for 40 seconds
• Multiple network cuts on 3G for up to 4 minutes 13 seconds
4.2.3 Observation on Kuusisaari
As shown in Figure 23 and Figure 24, is a representation of two different routes
covered on two different days, 2015-02-20 and 2015-03-03, for data capturing in
Kuusisaari part of Helsinki.
4.2.3.1 Elisa
• Downgrade to 2G for 2 minutes 28 seconds
• Multiple LAC changes (might be normal)
• Lost the 2G network for 1 minute 45 seconds
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Figure 21: Itinerary in Kulosaari on 2015-02-13. Red dots indicate approximate
location of major events.
Figure 22: Itinerary in Kulosaari on 2015-03-03. Red dots indicate approximate
location of major events.
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Figure 23: Itinerary in Kusisaari on 2015-02-20. Red dots indicate approximate
location of major events.
Figure 24: Itinerary in Kusisaari on 2015-03-03.
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4.2.3.2 Sonera
• Nothing to remark
4.2.3.3 DNA
• Nothing to remark
4.3 Summary
The gathered events and findings presented above in the concluded experimental
study can be argued not to be solid enough to claim that these network activities are
abnormal, but certain suspicious occurrences such as: downgrades from 3G to 2G in
areas that are not densely populated, at times where little activity is present, are
unusual. Especially regarding the coverage claims from the operators. In addition,
and while these details are not fully disclosed here, several of the major events noted
correspond to moments when incoming calls and SMS were never reaching the devices
(using Snoopsnitch active testing mode).
A proposed solution to solidify these results would be to directly collaborate with
the network operators, presenting the possibility to be able to cross-check the events
we encountered with the state of the network on their side at the same time. To
achieve this goal, we have made attempts to reach out to some of the operators but
did not get any response from them. Future work on this topic would consider deeper
analysis at other sites of base-band log parsing on the UE, which contains more
information. In addition, verification and analysis done in this work was performed
by a human. To achieve better result and accuracy, we are proposing to use machine
learning techniques to analyze the logs at the Android OS level, and possibly at the
baseband log level.
Finally, a detection and mitigation solution enabling the user equipment to verify
the authenticity of the BTS it is attempting to connect to, as well as predefined
scenarios for the cases where the UE is believed to be in a hostile environment35 is
presented as the main work of this project in the following Chapter.
35IMSI Catcher, and fake BTS.
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5 Proposed Detection and Mitigation methods
5.1 Introduction and work background
While much has already been discussed on the existence and presence of fake base
stations and their intentions in a network (section 3), the focus therefore in this
section is to propose a methodology that can be implemented in the user’s mobile
equipment for its detection and mitigation. This methodology should be implemented
as a software or an application that relies on the real operator’s database information
of all existing and genuine base transceiver station. Meaning that the user’s mobile
device plays an active and fragile role, as the actual detector which after spotting
an abnormal activity then alerts or reports to the operator of a suspicious fake base
station present in the network.
Figure 25: General overview of proposed methodology indicating process flow.
A detailed description of figure 25 is as follows. Logically, there are four entities
and these are; mobile device (which we are proposing to be the real detector), fake
BTS (not initially known as fake), real BTS (we are also initially uncertain of), and
the operator’s database (implemented in the network). These four are represented
using candle stick notation of different box sizes, and different colors to denote
different considered interaction states (this will be properly explained hereafter).
There are two types of line notations used, dotted and straight.
We start with the general assumption that both the mobile device and operator’s
network have already passed through an authentication process and confirmed to be
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genuine, and therefore are certain that the mobile device is connected and have access
to the real database. For several reasons, one of such is mobility [64, 26], mobile
device interacts with one or many base stations, for instance during mobility where
the mobile device is in motion, and moving from one location to another. During
this stage, received Quality of Service (QoS) is a priority that must be maintained,
therefore the mobile device keeps listening to nearby base stations to select the one
offering best transmission signal power [31].
The pair of black dotted lines as we see in figure 25, denoted as number one, is
used to represent unconfirmed base stations that the mobile device is able to receive
transmission signal from i.e. through which the mobile device can communicate with
the network if they are genuine. As a detector, mobile device uses our proposed
methodology (described in section 5.2.1) to verify all received nearby signals. The red
solid line which is numbered as two denotes a suspicious BTS, while the second BTS,
denoted by a long black solid line and numbered three is used to represent the real
operator’s BTS. The final phase of the proposed methodology, denoted by a green
line and numbered as four, represent an alert initiated by mobile device and sent to
the network of a suspicious activity and the presence of an unregistered BTS in the
network. One might then ask how certain are we that the alert gets to the network,
for instance, what if it is sent via a new fake BTS that just joined shortly after the
verification process was done? Answer: is that after the verification process, we
have two separate sets of BTSs, fake and real. Since we know the real (through
authentication), we choose to send through this, while we ignore the uncertain BTS.
On a precise note, proposed methodology should enable a mobile device to
practically detect false base station and alert the network as a mitigating step on
2G, 3G, 4G, and possibly 5G (future), in these two considered cases:
1. A base transceiver station with wrong LAC/CID but on the operator network.
Such fake BTS in this case have correct MNC and MCC.
2. A base transceiver station with correct LAC/CID but existing on the operator
network, trying to pass for a real BTS.
- What precisely are: LAC, CID, MNC, MCC?
With billions of devices interacting in the present mobile networks, it is expected
for every of these participating devices to have some form of identification which
makes it possible for operators to identify them. It is of course not sufficient enough
to have just each device’s number but to also be able to locate them. That is the
fundamental idea behind the creation of LAC and CID. As shown in figure 26, each
cell of a network has its own unique identification number and this is referred to
as Cell ID. LAC on the other hand is used to denote a collection of several cells
in a mapped location, which is controlled by an operator controlling that specific area.
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Mobile Country Code (MCC) and Mobile Network Code (MNC) are assigned
codes to represent the country and the service rendering operator respectively [30].
A glimpse of what these two acronyms represent and are used for in detail can be
found in [65].
In a relative term, CID would represent a building on a street, while LAC would
represent the collection of several buildings to make up a street. So when a paper
mail is to be delivered to a specific resident in that area, the carrier (post man) first
find the street, locate the building on that street, and finally check through the list
of residents in the building to deliver the mail to rightful recipient.
Figure 26: Clarification between Location Area Code (LAC) and Cell Identity
(CID).
Building on this knowledge, the first case mentioned above therefore arises when
a false base station, which can be operating as a proxy in the operator network or
not, does not use an existing LAC/CID combination from the operator it claims to
be connected to. While in the second case, false base station impersonates a real
base station within the attack region and thus pretend to be part of the operator’s
network. It is also possible in this case to have the false base station connected as a
proxy to the operator network, or not connected to it at all.
5.1.1 Considered scenarios
A more detailed technical overview, which shows the type of information passed
from one entity to another and the process flow in an ideal situation, as a way of
complementing the already described procedure of figure 25 is given and explained
in figure 27. By an ideal situation, we refer to a genuine case that comprises of real
BTS, and real DB, which is what our first scenario case describes (as we shall later
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see). Meanwhile, the interaction flow in figure 27 between active entities is briefly
described as follows;
1. Mobile Station initiates interaction by sending an encrypted data request mes-
sage for core network’s copy of genuine list of database to the Base Transceiver
Station. This encryption is secured with the core network’s public key, which is
denoted as OpKEY, to ensure that only core network can access this message.
2. Base Transceiver Station forward this encrypted data to the core network.
3. Core network decrypt received mobile station encrypted data. Then makes a
copy of genuine lists of BTS, as requested by MS i.e. Req BTS. Finally, Core
Network responds with an encrypted message, denoted as Res BTS, ensuring
that only the right MS can decrypt this message by using MS public key i.e.
MSKEY, and then forward to BTS.
4. Base Transceiver Station forward this message from Core network to mobile
station.
5. Mobile Station decrypt received encrypted message from Core network, and then
compare the received Database list denoted as DBcore, to its own Database 36
denoted as DBMS.
Figure 27: Description of the process flow and transferred data between the three
participating entities in the network.
36Using Figure 25: Mobile Station listens to all received nearby transmitting BTSs, and stores
them
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The procedure above is intended to clarify misconceptions and should help to
better understand discussion that arises in the next three considered scenarios, which
are denoted as case 1, case 2, and case 3 as presented below;
Case 1:
As depicted in figure 28, mobile station interacts with the real operator’s database
via the operator’s base station. In this case, we are certain that the data in the
database are genuine simply because it is the real operator’s database, and MS is
able to access it. This means that the mobile station, through listening, is able
to acquire necessary parameters such as; LAC, CID, and Powerphone from nearby
cells. While through already explained interactive process between MS and Core
Network in figure 27, mobile device gets access to several genuine data set useful for
comparison.
Figure 28: Scenario considers mobile device communicating with a real base station
and the real network’s database. These equipments on the network sides are genuine.
Each data set include parameters such as LAC, CID, Powernow (measured transmit
power from base station), and GPSreal (since base station is static). With these
parameters, we can compute;
• GPSEST through Powerphone and other Radio data.
• PowerEST through Powerphone, GPSreal, GPSphone, and Powernow.
After computing these two parameters, a comparison process between them and
other important and useful parameters is expected to be performed in order to reach
a possible conclusion to detecting a rogue base station. The comparison procedure is
explained below:
39
1. Mobile Station checks if GPSEST is not equal to GPSreal: variations in GPS
coordinates can help to make conclusions. For instance, if actual BTS location
realized is far too greater than the expected transmitting BTS location.
2. It is also possible to check if PowerEST is not equal to Powernow: This also
is similar to the above explanation, although it might not be an appropriate
method to base conclusion on because different factors can influence the received
transmission power, which can sum up to cause huge variation i.e. interfer-
ence generated around the cell. (See section 5.2.3 for detailed power estimation)
Case 2:
Unlike the first case considered where the network is completely genuine and accessing
the database through a real BTS was possible, this second case centers around the
existence and interference of fake BTS on mobile device accessibility to the database.
We split this scenarios into two as; access to DB via genuine BTS, and access to DB
only through fake BTS.
Figure 29: A wandering mobile device receiving signal both from genuine and fake
base stations as it approaches the fake one.
- Access to Database via genuine BTS
Using figure 29, it is possible to consider two scenarios. The first one being a situation
where mobile phone is at the mid-point of the three cells, meaning that it is getting
signals from both genuine and fake BTSs, but moving more toward a fake base
station. In this situation, mobile station try to connect to DB through fake BTS,
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higher transmission power, which obviously cannot work because a fake base station
cannot get access to the real network’s database i.e. not authenticated.
The second possible occurrence is when the mobile device connects to a genuine
BTS, even with the presence of high transmitting fake base station around, and then
successfully connects to the network’s database as described in case 1.
- Access to Database only through fake BTS
In a situation as this, where the mobile station can only locate or is surrounded
by only fake base stations, it is definitely obvious that it cannot gain access to
the network’s database. As depicted in figure 30, mobile station moves closer to
the fake base station, and therefore senses only that base station which it then
attempt to connect through to get to database. Since the fake base station is not
legally registered to the network, its does not exist to the core network, and there-
fore can not establish any interaction in that network i.e. connect to the real database.
The only remaining possibility therefore is for the mobile station to compare and
check for genuity of existing BTSs with the local copy of the real network’s database
previously stored on its internal SD-CARD.
Figure 30: A situation where mobile device can only receive signal from a fake base
station.
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Case 3:
Figure 31 illustrate another possible scenario where mobile device is totally commu-
nicating through and with the attacker’s set-up network. It has been demonstrated
that this is possible in the work of Yubo Song et al (see [58]).
In this type of scenario, where the mobile device has no connection to the real
operator’s network, it can only rely on the data already stored in itself. Meaning for
instance, the use of SD-CARD or internal storage holding a copy of the legal data
previously collected as the only option to revert.
Figure 31: The interaction between Mobile station and the network can not be
trusted because the network is completely unknown.
5.2 Fake BTS Detection Methodology
The methodology proposed in this section is modeled under certain assumptions,
and works without the need of having to design a new physical hardware. Assuming
that the assumptions discussed in section 5.3.1 are met, the whole methodology can
be implemented and installed as a software on existing mobile device.
5.2.1 Detection methodology
The proposed methodology relies on two main assumptions (see section 5.3.1): The
availability of a database, in the operator’s network, that the mobile device can query
through a genuine BTS, and which holds a recently updated list of LAC/CID, GPS
coordinates (and eventually power emitted) for all the BTS deployed by the operator.
The second assumption is that the mobile device is able to receive vital information
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Figure 32: Overall schematic of the proposed methodology.
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such as; LAC/CID and transmitting power from neighboring BTSs within range.
When all these conditions are met, the mobile station which is already equipped
through the installation of the proposed methodology as a software, should be able
to run the following sequence of steps depicted in Figure 32 at regular intervals:
1. Collect the list of BTS that are within range (possible since MS keep listening
to all available nearby transmitting signals), enabling it access also to their
various signal power and also their LAC/CID as well;
2. For each BTS in this list:
(a) Calculate estimated location (see section 5.2.2);
(b) Compare received parameters 37 from the network’s DB to own internal
database i.e. SD-CARD (see figure 33);
Figure 33: Proposed methodology implemented as a sofware on mobile device to
verify data.
(c) If the LAC/CID is not in the DB: The BTS with this LAC/CID could
be a fake (figure 33). Report the details (LAC/CID, power, estimated
location) to the operator and move on to the next BTS in the list.
(d) Else, check if the BTS with this LAC/CID is active (i.e. in a normal
state);
37LAC/CID, received signal strength, e.t.c
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(e) Compare the estimated location with the one obtained from the database;
(f) If the distance between estimated and the real location are too different,
send an alert or report to the operator;
(g) Else, move to the next BTS in the list.
Both power and location estimation can be derived using the received signal strength
as described in the following subsections. The reason for discussing how this estimates
can be achieved is because of cases where the mobile device also need to estimate
transmitting device’s location, as we have seen in cases where there is no access or
connectivity to the core network. For instance, in case 3 discussed above.
5.2.2 Location Estimation
One benefit of using mobile device as a detector is the dynamic nature it possesses,
which gives it the flexibility to move from one location to another. This attribute to
move around makes it possible to directly triangulate the origin of the signal coming
from the BTS being analyzed under suspicion. Triangulation is relatively simple
to perform as described, for both mobile device and network BTS, in the following
given illustration for clarity purpose, and to better understand its application to
our case, while one can also refer to this webpage 38 for more description of the method.
- Network Location estimation
A network’s BTS is able to apply the triangulating method this way: Since the
antennas on a BTS are arranged in a triangle (this explains the mid-center triangle in
the figures), and by dividing the surroundings of a BTS into three sectors, as depicted
in figure 34, it is then possible for BTS to tell from which side (sector) the interacting
device is stationed. The number marking one to five, usually extend more than this
in reality, in the same figure is used to denote the distances away from the base station.
Using just one BTS, which is the BTS interested in estimating the location of
an intruder, it first must be able to determine where the signal is coming from, and
we have chosen the beta sector of figure 34 for this. It is not difficult to estimate
intruder’s location through the received signal strength which to support this example
is chosen to be five miles away. Meaning that the suspect can be in any point along
the marked region and this is not sufficient enough.
Since signal is radiated in all directions from the source, a second nearby BTS
also in that vicinity, can can also play a part in estimating the location of the suspect
whose signal is also received by this second BTS. Figure 35 depict a case where the
second BTS also estimates the location of these suspicious device, and then follow a
similar approach as described in BTS 1. Judging by the diagram, BTS 2 senses the
38http://www.neilson.co.za/mobile-network-geolocation-obtaining-the-cell-ids-the-signal-
strength-of-surrounding-towers-from-a-gsm-modem/
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Figure 34: Application of the triangulation method to aid in estimating fake trans-
mitting device location using one Base Transceiver Station only.
signal in the alpha sector, and using the strength of the received transmission signal
from device, it estimate device to be four miles away. One can see that the location
is getting more narrowed and exact that in using just one BTS.
For a better and more precise location estimation, this method is applied to a
third BTS, depicted in figure 36, which also senses the transmitting signal of the
mobile device five miles away.
- Location estimation for Mobile device
Mobile devices can also apply the triangulating method to locate devices but in
a slightly different way than used in the network’s BTS. The first requirement is for
the mobile device to already have information about the carrier and coordinates of
the vicinity, this type of information is available on these web sites 39.
Mobile device, acting as a detector, measures and saves the received signal (device
39http://opencellid.org/, and http://location-api.com/
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Figure 35: Application of the triangulation method to achieve a better location
estimation for suspicious transmitting device using two Base Transceiver Stations.
signal strength) from the suspicious device first in location A. The detector moves
to another location B and also measures and saves the transmitting device’s signal
strength received. This procedure can be repeated in several locations for as much
as needed, with the knowledge that when more locations are covered, the chances to
estimate suspicious device location becomes more accurate. As depicted in figure 37,
from different locations, mobile device was able to collect different signal power from
the suspicious transmitting device, which then applies same triangulating method as
used in BTS estimation to estimate location.
5.2.3 Power Estimation
Finally, if the power emitted and received by the BTS are available, it is also possible
to estimate what power should be received from the analyzed BTS. Using statistical
modeling approach such as the Okumura-Hata model [26] and others 40, depending
on the building density, BTS height and frequency bands used by the BTS, we can
estimate the average path loss between the suspicious transmitting BTS and those
receiving its signal (real BTS as assumed in our case), and therefore also compare
the received power with the one that should be received.
Path loss measurement becomes very useful during the comparative analysis of the
received signal strengths (power) between expected and received values. A translation
of this is that by knowing path loss values, one is better equipped in judging what
value of received signal power is acceptable or can be considered suspicious. Figure 38
40Shadow fading, Multipath fading, exponential distribution
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Figure 36: Using three Base Transceiver Stations to help in estimating the location
of a suspicious transmitting device.
helps to solidify the description already explained.
The following describes how Okumura-Hata model is applied mathematically to
obtain the received power at the operator’s base station. Certain considerations are
taken into account such as; type of environment, and type of antenna used. Environ-
ment in this sense translates to the area type, and as such could be large or dense city,
medium or small size city, sub-urban, rural or open area, all of which are denoted as
i = 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. While the Antenna type for Okumura-Hata is Isotropic.
Okumura-Hata Average path loss is given as L50 (dB) = LF + Amu (f, d) - G
(hte) - G (hre) - GAREA.
where,
L50 = 50 percent value of propagation path loss (median).
LF = free space propagation loss.
Amu (f, d) = median attenuation relative to free space.
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Figure 37: Mobile device applying the triangulation method from three different
locations in order to estimate a fake base station.
Figure 38: Showing path loss between the transmitter and the receiver: it is the
difference (in dB) between the transmitted power and the received power.
G (hte) = base station antenna height gain factor.
G (hre) = mobile antenna height gain factor.
GAREA = gain due to environment.
f and d = operating frequency (150MHz - 1500MHz in the original Okumura-
Hata model and 1500MHz - 2000MHz in the new extension of same model called
COST-231) and distance between transmitter and receiver in kilometer respectively.
Further computation done by substituting the value of L50 into PR, denoting the
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received power at the base station is given below.
PR = PT - L50.
where,
PT = transmitted power from source.
As one should expect, each of these parameters used briefly to calculate the
received signal strength (power) in the above illustration can further be studied to
understand their derivation in order to understand better their impact when used in
modeling real life situations (kindly refer to [26]).
5.3 Fake Base Station Mitigation algorithm
Mobile device is the main detector in this work, but like every other end user’s mobile
device, it has no power to decide on device allowed to participate or use the network
resources. The core network does this. Therefore, mitigation, the other part of this
work, is carried out in the core network, as shown in figure 39.
Figure 39: Mobile device sends an alert message to the core network about the
existence of a suspicious transmitter.
By mitigation, we try to lessen the effect of a suspicious transmitting device, a
fake base station in this case, by proposing a methodology relying on the fact that
being able to identify its existence or presence in the network, is the beginning of
curbing its disturbance in the network. It is usually or almost impossible for the
network operators to even notice them when they exist. Therefore, we present as
given in figure 39 the simple alert algorithm to mitigating the effect of fake BTS as
follows;
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1. Mobile device already compare several parameters (see section 5.2.1). If a
suspicious device is found transmitting, MS sends an alert message to the core
network through BTS.
2. Network’s BTS forwards the message to the core network.
3. Core network verifies received message and takes some mitigating decision on
what next to do.
5.3.1 Discussion on the Assumptions made
Assumption that MS can Triangulate and estimate Power
It is assumed in this work, that the mobile station, which is the analyzing device,
is able to triangulate in order to locate the position of the suspicious transmitting
mobile device as previously explained in section 5.2.2, and estimate power "well
enough" which is useful during comparative analysis for detection purpose.
Assumption on a Database of BTS from the operator
It is also assumed that the base station can have access (i.e. can query) to a
database of all the operator’s BTS. This database is assumed to have the following
information:
1. All the LAC/CID combinations in use for the operator BTS.
2. The associated GPS location (precise) of all the operator’s BTS.
3. (Optional) The power at which the BTS is emitting right now.
The proposed methodology requires that each BTS can query this database, to search
for a list of LAC/CID combinations, and obtain the associated GPS location and
power for all the records that are found in the database. This information is sent
back to the BTS that queried it, for verifying if the neighboring BTS are legitimate.
Assumption on the Connection BTS-DB
It is finally assumed that the connection between the BTS carrying the analy-
sis and the DB holding all BTS information for the operator, is secure and not
compromised.
5.4 Alternative approach: Problems encountered
Time and resources are two important factors that must be well planned and managed
in any research work, especially such as this one. In an ideal situation, expectation is
to have access to a genuine data set for comparison purpose with the data captured
from the practical measurement described in section 4. By a genuine data set, we
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refer to the data that contains network interaction activity with other transmitting
devices, stored in the core network’s database, from the network operator. This
would serve as the standard data set, with the understanding that these have not
been compromised as explained in section 5.3.1.
- Initial approach: Network operator (data)
We intended to compare these two different set of data i.e. data from the network,
and data from practical network measurement, using either manual or automated
software. After this, further work would be to apply some statistical and graphical
approach to analyze our findings in order to identify abnormal activities in the
network. The major drawback or problem encountered from using this approach
was that after submitting a request to several network operators within the vicinity
of interest, the response was not favorable and this is due to the security measures
on sensitive data involved. Such data contains real life and real people’s data and
activities, therefore its not an easy data to give out to a third party. It requires a
long process and documentations submission, which stretches the time limit we have
to carry out this project work.
- Network Simulator
Following the choice of approach eventually used, which is to propose a methodology
for detection. We also thought of using a network simulator to develop a system level
simulator to demonstrate the scenarios considered in this work. This would require
simulating in different cellular networks i.e. 2G, 3G, and 4G. The first option was to
simulate our methodology using the new NS-3 (Network Simulator 3). Which means
more time is needed to study and use this simulator in order to write reasonable and
simple but functional codes. Considering the time frame we have left to finish the
project, it was unrealistic and impossible to accomplish the task of writing completely
a new simulation code. NS-3 only have an existing 4G (LTE) module, which can be
edited to suit our case. Alternatively, to use NS-2 (Network Simulator 2), that also
would require having some reasonable time to study the programming environment
and to write functional codes to suit our purpose.
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6 Conclusion
Years back, the arguments was that although several types of man in the middle
form of attack do exist, and have been in existence for many years, yet there is no
physical evidence of such attacking equipment as the described fake base station.
In response, many scientific articles have been published, see section 3, to support
the claim that they certainly do exist, and some have even gone to the extent of
building software version of such attack to support their claims, while a few others
have designed equipment that can catch IMSI-catcher (as it is sometimes referred
to). We acknowledge their existence and that is why we have chosen to work in this
direction, and to propose a solution to help mitigate such attacks.
As a starting point, we studied the security implementations in different genera-
tions of mobile technologies, this enabled us to understand why fake base station
attack occurs mainly on the 2G network. This is not just because 2G is still the
most widely adopted technology, but because its security implementation is very
vulnerable, as we did show in section 2, making it a suitable choice to carry out such
attack. So this means that if a target mobile device is on a 3G or 4G network, a
fake base station will manipulatively deceive and force a downgrade on this mobile
device, before fully exploiting it.
One of the main objectives we set to achieve in this work, as a way of contributing
to the fight against such attack, is to be able to identify a fake base station when
present in a network from user’s end point. This has two positive effects from both
business and technical point of view; first, network subscribers feel their importance
to the network topology, as they evidently see improvement in the security features
implemented, and to know that their data is getting better protection. This con-
solidates the trust already existing between subscribers and the network operators.
Secondly, network operators feel better in charge and control of their networks. We
are of the opinion that it is just not enough to render communication services to
subscribers, or to build general security mechanisms as we have, but to completely
understand who is causing the damage. After then can a solid mitigating step be
developed.
To help in mitigating fake base station attacks, and since mobile devices are not
designed to carry out any core network duties, we proposed a simple but functional
algorithm to alert the core network of the existence of a suspicious transmitting
device, otherwise referred to as a Fake BTS. In most cases, fake BTS only target
mobile devices, and not directly the core network, therefore it is possible for such
device to be in a network and not noticed. By this algorithm, the opinion is that
sensitizing the network is the first step to properly curb such an attack.
However, our proposed detection and mitigation methodology needs to be im-
plemented as a real software (application) on the mobile device. As one might have
observed, this work considers mobile device as the detector, to find dis-similarities
53
through comparison between data stored on mobile device and that received from core
network database. We would encourage future work to focus more on the network
side (core network), where an algorithm can be designed for the network to directly
spot this attacker and act against its participation in the network, particularly trans-
mission to mobile devices. Reason for this is related to the third case considered in
section 5.1.1, where there is possibility for the mobile station to be in the attacker’s
set up network, where the genuine network can not locate mobile device.
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A Eira: Data collection site
Here are the Lists of observed Embassies in the Eira part of Helsinki, Finland. One
of the three locations visited during the practical measurement phase.
• Embassy of Italy (Itäinen Puistotie 4, 00140 Helsinki (60.1588545, 24.9577421))
• Embassy of USA (Itäinen Puistotie 14 A, 00140 Helsinki (60.1571107, 24.9606093))
• Embassy of France (Itäinen Puistotie 13, 00140 Helsinki (60.1568308, 24.9602479))
• Embassy of Japan (Unioninkatu 20-22, 00130 Helsinki (60.1660545, 24.950773))
• Embassy of Brazil (Itäinen Puistotie 4 B 1, 00140 Helsinki (60.1589244,
24.9574973))
• Embassy of Belgium (Kalliolinnantie 5, 00140 Helsinki (60.158505, 24.9596014))
• Embassy of Estonia (Itäinen Puistotie 10, 00140 Helsinki (60.1578404, 24.9594198))
• Embassy of Kazakhstan (Unioninkatu 24, 00130 Helsinki (60.1663084, 24.9506673))
• Embassy of South Africa (Pohjoinen Makasiinikatu 4, 00130 Helsinki (60.16552,
24.9510308))
• Embassy of Turkey (Puistokatu 1 B A 3, 00140 Helsinki (60.1585628, 24.9538638))
B Kulosaari: Data collection site
This were the observed Embassies in the Kulosaari part of Helsinki, Finland. The
second location visited during the practical data capturing phase.
• Embassy of China (Vanha Kelkkamäki 9-11, 00570 Helsinki (60.18303, 25.005794))
• Embassy of Iran (Kulosaarentie 9, 00570 Helsinki (60.1840489, 25.0052605))
• Embassy of Vietnam (Kulosaarentie 12, 00570 Helsinki (60.1844906, 25.0041641))
• Embassy of India (Kulosaarentie 32, 00160 Helsinki (60.1842178, 25.0091695))
• Embassy of Ukraine (Vahaniityntie 9, 00570 Helsinki (60.185278, 25.0176697))
• Embassy of Serbia (Kulosaarentie 36, 00570 Helsinki (60.184102, 25.0096631))
• Embassy of Iraq (Lars Sonckin tie 2, 00570 Helsinki (60.1835136, 25.0138013))
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C Kuusisaari: Data collection site
This are the lists of Embassies observed in the third and final location where practical
measurement was carried out. It is called Kuusisaari, in the western part of Helsinki,
Finland.
• Embassy of Indonesia (Kuusisaarentie 3, 00340 Helsinki, (60.187327, 24.868043))
• Embassy of Germany (Krogiuksentie 4, 00340 Helsinki, (60.185989, 24.867097))
• Embassy of Bulgaria (Kuusisaarentie 2B, 00340 Helsinki, (60.186925, 24.870268))
• Embassy of Japan (Kuusisaarentie 6, 00340 Helsinki, (60.186501, 24.868699))
• Residence of the Ambassador of Iran (Kuusisaarentie 4, 00340 Helsinki, (60.186640,
24.869764))
• Residence of the Ambassador of Korea (Hirvilahdenkuja 5, 00340 Helsinki,
(60.189031, 24.867320))
